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Pivotal Decomposition to Find Availability and
Failure-Frequency of Systems with Common-Cause Failures
John Yuan 2. GENERAL MODEL
National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu
Basic Assumptions:
Key Words-Availability, Common-cause failure, Failure 1. The system and its components switch between G
frequency, Pivotal decomposition (good) and F (failed).
Reader AIlds- 2. Asides from CCFs, components are s-independent.
Purpose: Widen the state of the art A CCF can be regarded as the failure of the parallel system
Special math needed for explanations: Probability of components in such a CCF and its repair has to wait for
Special math needed to use results: Same a certain period time (especially during very severe external
Results useful to: Power system and reliability analysts environment) after that the repair is regarded as that of the
corresponding parallel system of components in such a
Abstract-The purpose of this article is to extend the pivotal CCF in the S-independent case.
decomposition method for system availability and failure fre- 3. All transition rates are constant and the system has
quency from the case where components are statistically indepen- reached steady state
dent to that where components are also subject to common-cause
failures. This method requires as input data the failure rate and
the mean repair time of each component, the occurrence rate of Notation
each common-cause failure, and the mean-time for repairing it. CCF common-cause failure
x, x Good, Failed states of an isolated component X
Editors'Note:Itwas not feasible toreconcileallthemajor xx2x, denotes: all components of an isolated sub-
differences between the referees and the author, especially system of X,, X2, ...,XI fail under a common-
with regard to the complexity of the notation and conse- cause
quent difficulty in determining the theory's correctness. We - - - s
are publishing this paper to provide an exchange of ideas system of X1, X2,...comp, Xesfails-independently
and information. Correspondence is invited on this topic. sydtes of anisolaede sub-
xlx2...x. denotes: all components of an isolated sub-
system of X1, X2, ..., X. are in G
1. INTRODUCTION c(x1,x2, ...x,,) state in combinatorial form for an isolated
subsystem of X1, X2, ..., X,. For the subsystem of
Most articles on system reliability assume that com- X, Y, Z: c(x, y, z) E {xyz, z xYz,xyz, xyz,
ponents are s-independent ["s-" means statistical(y)]. Hence xyz xyz, xyz, xzy, xyz, xyz, xyz, xzy, xyzI,
the availability of a series (1-out-of-n:F) system and the C, C' a subset of components, and its complement set
unavailability of a parallel (1-out-of-n:G) system are the pro- CCF(C, C') event: at least one CCF which involves com-
ducts of availabilities and unavailabilities of components ponents from both C and C' occurs
respectively. Several approaches have been presented for e., ei event: X is in G, F. For the system of X, Y, Z:
s-dependent components because the simple product rule e- = {xyz, xyz, xyz, x xyz}, e. =x{yz, xyz,doesn't apply. The method of restricting Markov processes to eyz xyz xyz}
feasible sets of s-dependent components [1-2] faces the dilem- X'ZI X)'Z I
ma of how to estimate the failure rate of each component ect(X es 2xXs) eventxcomponentsXFoX2as X, assume
when it depends on others, and the computational complexity the state c(xl,e..=x2 For a em o X,Y, Z.exy
when such a set is large. The association method which covers xyz
s-dependency calculates only bounds of the true system and exyz = {xYz}
reliability [3]. xl +x2+... +x, (combined state) denotes: at least one
Restricting s-dependent failures to common-causes, component is in G and no CCF for an isolated
several authors [4-7] studied a parallel system of two or three subsystem of X1, X2, ..., Xs. If the subsystem is
components. Yuan [8] tried to calculate the availability of a parallel with s-independent components, its G
general system with common-cause failures over cut-sets on- state is xl + x2 + . ...... + xs. For a system of X, Y, Z:
ly. A CCF (common-cause failure) [4-10] is the simultaneous x + y = {xy, x~y, xy } which is a combined state
failure of several components due to a single stress from the and x + y U {xy7, xy is the totality of states for
outside environment such as earthquake, flood, hurricane, the isolated subsystem of AT and Y
fire, lightning, or thunderstorm. This article presents a ex1+x2+. +s, event: AT1, AT2, .., AT,is in state x1 + x2 +
pivotal decomposition method to calculate both availability + xs. For a system of AT, Y, Z: ex+y = {xyz, xyz,
and failure frequency for any system whose CCFs are over x~yz, xyz xyTz, xyzi}, but the totality of system
any sets of components, along the lines of [8, 10]. states = ex+y U ex- U eXz U ey- U eXy U e2?y
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Px, py availability, unavailability of an isolated X; 1+2
Pr{exlno CCF({x},{x} ')}, Pr{e.1no CCF({x}, I/rl+2
{x}')} {X} ) }
^
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1+2 |
Px,X2,...,XS) probability of c(xl, x2, ..., xs) for an isolated
subsystem of X1, X2, ..., Xs; it is the same as Fig. 2-a.
Pr{e,,(x1,2...X) lno CFF(C,C')}, where C _ {xl,
X2,. .,xs} 1 1 1
Px1+x2+...+xs Pr{ex1+x2+...+xsjno CCF(C,C')}, where r1+2 r, + P1+2 = P11,2]
C {xl, X2, ...,Xs} l-P1+2 /
>4+2 =
P1+2 r1+2 /P,2..sJ 1 - II (l-Pi)
Case 2: If 12 occurs, then figure 1 turns into figure 2-b
S system and the system G-state identifier aftercombining states properly [10].
S(C), S(C) reduced subsystems of S by regarding all com- 1+2
ponents of C to be G or F respectively; also their 1/rl+2
G-state identifiers A1+2 pl012
ps, Fs; pJ, Fs, system availability, failure frequency; same p11,21
except system components are s-independent
X, rx failure rate, mean repair time of an isolated X Fig. 2-b.
XxX2 .. Xs occurrence rate of the CCF X1X2 P12Xs2P=2Pr{ 12nno 121
wxIx2J.5 mean waiting time for repairing x1x2 ....x P1+2 n Pr{l +2nno 12}
XXi+X2+...+Xs5rxl+x2+...+xs transition rate from
Xj+X2+.. +Xs to xix2... xs, mean time from X2Pr{12no12}(1-Pr{12})
X1X2...Xs to xl +x2 +... +xs. If the subsystem of
X1,X2, .. ,Xs is parallel with s-independent com- _ PlP2( -P12)
ponents,thenXxl+x2+. ~~~~~~~~~12ponents, then )Xl+x1+ .... .
.+x, and rxl+x2+...+xs are its P[1,2](1-Pi2)
failure rate and mean repair time.
Fc, FX system failure frequencies due to the CCF of ex- = P1P2 XX12
actly those components of C, or to the failure of P[1,2]
X.
Other, standard notation is given in "Information for A similar n-component sytem is much more complex, even
Readers & Authors" at rear of each issue. for n = 3. Because the mean time from 12 to its first transi-
tion into 1+2 is W12 + rl+2, consider figure 2-c instead of
figure 2-b as the underlying model for a 2-component3. MODELS system.
3.1 2-Component System 1+2
/r12 1/I,l12l+r1+2
Many models for a 2-component parallel system have /PJ2 P1A IP2
AA A12T1 '2
appeared in [4-6]. Figure 1 illustrates a different one which 1+2 Pli2 12 - ,,21 12
holds for both parallel and series. The final underlying
model comes from it. Fig. 2-c.
3.2 3-Component System in General
12 . .A12 Configuration (See Appendix)
l/r1 | ,< 12 I/r1
,\| i ~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~1+2+31l+2+ 12 123 )11,2,31J 1
12~~ ~ ~ ~2 .W 1. 142¶3 . 123+LZ
Fig. 1. Reliability model with CCF for a 2-component system P1P2/ w13\+r1+3
Case1: I 12doesn't occur, then figure 1, and those models 12 Pt1l 2,3] ^13 e237in (4-6], turn into figure 2-a after combining states proper- l
ly [10]. Fig. 3.
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The transition rate from 1 + 2+3 to e-, is: Lemma A can be generalized to lemma C which states
results of the extended reliability to an n-component
Pr{eij} Pr{ei1 n no CCF}I system.
P1+2+3 Pr{1+2+3 n no CCF} J
Lemma C: If ec., 1<i<m are pairwise disjoint (ie, ci f c
Pr{eijlno CCF}Pr{no CCF} < = 4 for all i . j) and UCi = {1,2,...,n}, then -
Pr{1 +2+3Ino CCF}Pr{no CCF} 1
P1+2+... n 1 + Xl+2+...+nrl+2+...+n + Ei2BE,
_ PiPjp ,
P[1i2,3, Pr{eEj} = (ljpPX)JXc,(wc,+rsc,)P1+2+...+ L
Lemma A, for figure 3, can be proved in terms of lemma 1 Theorem 1 (See appendix for proof):
in appendix. Case 1: m = 1. ps = PelP (cl) + (1 -Pel)p4
Lemma A: Let B123 -X)1t+2+3 r14243; Case 2: ea1, ea2, ... eEm are pairwise disjoint (viz,
B.. _ PippXij(wij+ri+,) for li<jS3; n X for all i .
P[ 1,2,3]
1 P~~~~~~~~~~s=EiPr{eE,}Pr{SJea, + (I-EiPr{eE,})p'
B=113 PlP2P3Xl23(wl+2+3 + rl+2+3).
l iPr{eEJ}Ps(ai) + (1 - Ei Pr{eaJ})p4
Then -
1 Case 3: C1,C2, .. . ,Cm are pairwise disjoint.
P1+2+3 I+ B23 + B2 + B3 + BA3=1+B123 Br~~~~+Br~ B~~ Ps Pe12(lpcfl( -Pe~))PIS-,i~EA)
A iEA 1jOA
Pr{eij} =pipjX,1(wij+rri+j)pl+2+3 ° +(fl1(1 -pc,))ps C
4. SYSTEM AVAILABILITY 5. SYSTEM FAILURE FREQUENCY
More Notation More Notation
C(s) {x1, X2, ... Xs} es event: system is in G
C x1x2. ...xs, for C C (s) h map: ec - ec; the map changes the G state of
Xc XX2. Xs9 for C C(s= components of C from their CCF state e and
wc, ra c wX1x2 ....orrX1+52+.. +x5, for C =c leaves all other component states the same
ec, ec ex152.......xsand eX1X2. ......xsfor C - C(s) .......... \ operator:setdifference
ec,ec ex1X2 ....xs and %'X1X2 ....Xs, for c _c(s)PC, PE ~ and p~12 for C c= s
mnumberof. subsets subjectto CCFThe following events are consequences of these andm of subsets subject to CCF ohrdfntosother definitions.
C, subsets of system components that are subject to
CCF C1's, for 1<i<m esnfec = system is in G and components of C are in G
E, IfIi, U i sum, product, union over all i from I to m
C[m] Ui Ci esn ec = system is in G and components of C are under e
P[m] 1 - fil (1 - PE) h`(esneE) = {system G states in which all components of
C are in G, will still be system G states if C occurs}
A union of all non-empty subsets of components
Be,
I ( rI P)Xc, (wc, + ra c1), for C n Ck * , (es nec) \ h(esn eZ) = {system G states in which all com-P[rn] Xeci ' g ponents of C are in G and will become system F states if C
for all]j : k ocr}
S(C1,ieA) subnetwork of S by regarding components of ocr}
U to be in G, also G state of such a subnetwork The system failure frequency that is due to the occur-
PS(a,.ieA) Pr{S(C1,iEAjno C, for allj%A}, for rence of C is [12,13]:
C1,C2,...,Cm pairwise disjoint
Fc= Pr{(esflec) \h(e5flec)}Xc (5.1)
Lemma B: Pr{eC(xl,X2,... xs) } = Pc(xl,X2. Xs) if and only if
{X1,X2,. . .xs} and {X1,X2,.. .,sx5} ' ares-independent. OI Eq. (5.1) can be developed further-
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Pr{esfnec} = Pr{system Gfncomponents of C in G} Example I
= Pr{system Gncomponents of Cin Gnno CCF(C,C ) Given: 13 is the only CCF.
= Pr{system Glcomponents of Care in Gnno Ps = Pi3PS1,3- + (1 -Pi3)PSI (by theorem 1, catse 1)
CCF(C,C')} Pr{components of Care in Glno FS = (P5(1,3) -PS(i,3))Pl3X13 + S (PSx -PS(X))PxXx
CCF(C,C ')}Pr{no CCF(C,C ')} xF- 2, 4,5
=Ps(c)Pc(1 -Pr{CCF(C,C')}) (bylemmaB) (5.2) + [(Psi -Ps(l))PlXl + (Ps(3 -PS(3))P3X31(l -tom)(by theorem 2)
Pr{esfnec} = Pr{system Gnchappens nno CCF(C, C')}
pm = p1p3X13(W13 + rl+3)p1+3
=Ps(c)Pp(l- Pr{CCF(C,C ')}) (by lemma B) (5.3)
Pr{h-1(esneo)} = Pr{h1(esneo) nno CCF(C,C')} (P=+3) +Xl+3r,+3 + 1 -W(1 -pr)(i -)PlP3( 13 1+3)
(by lemma A)
= Pr{hfl(esnefe)1no CCF(C,C ')}Pr{no CCF(C,C ')}
Example 2
= Pr{esflealno CCF(C,C')} Pr{eclno CCF(CC ') Given: 13 & 45 are only CCFs.
Pr{no CCF(C,C')} Ps = P13p45ps(1,3,4,5) + pm-3(1
-p4-s)Pr{S(1,3)|no 45}
+ (1 -pT3)ps-sPr{S(4,5)Jno 13}
= Ps(a)P_PE (1 -Pr{CCF(C,C ')}) + (1
-pr-3)(1 -pi-s)Pr{SJno 13; no 45}
= Ps(c)PC(I -Pr(CCF(C,C')} (5.4) = PThPsPsi,3 ) + pI-(1 -P-)P( )
By using (5.2) - (5.4), the (5.1) becomes: + (1 -Pm)P4ipT5 ,s + (1 -pm)(1 -P4)Ps
(by theorem 1, case 3)
Fc = (Ps(c) -Ps(C))PCXc(1 -Pr{CCF(C,C ')}) (5.5)
FS = (Ps(1,3) -Ps(i,3))P13X13 + (Ps(4,s) -Ps(4,g))P45X45
More Notation
+ (PS(2) -PS(2))p2X2 + ( (Ps(x) -Ps())pPxX(1 - pm)
n number of components x=-1,3
Es sum over all components from x=1 ton+n(y (P5(y)-psi pyXy)(1-p4) y theorem2)
syt implies the sum over all ] such that Cj f c;* q and
c,incf * / pJ = pipj Xi$wij + rt+j)pi+j, (i,j) = (1,3) or (4,5)
The system failure frequency is Example 3
Given: 13 & 35 are only CCFs. Then em- and e5-5 are disjoint.
Fs= Sic + E2xFx (5.6)
= Pr{em3}ps(j,3) + Pr{ei5}pI()3,-
Fc, (ps(q) -ps(E,))pcC,)1 2-EJtPr UeEj}) (5.7) P
= (P5c, -s~)p~X - ~P{e~})(57) + (1 - Pr{em3} - Pr{e35})psJ (by theorem 1, case 2)
FX= (Ps(x) -Ps(i))PxXx (1 -I Pr{ Uee.} (5.8)
xECj Fs = (Ps(1,3)-S(i.3))P13X13(1 -Pr{e35})
6. EXAMPLES + (P5(3.5) -PS(3.))P35X350( -Pr{em3}
All examples in this section use figure 3. + (Ps(2) -Ps(2))P2XA2
ILri-iy1 -Lr I + (P5(4) -PS(4))P4X4




Fig. 3. A reliability Logic Bridge Diagram + (Ps(s)-Ps(s))PSXs(1-Pr{ei-}) (y theorem 2)
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Pr{e7.} = pipjX)1(w11 + ri+j)pl+3+5 Proof of Theorem 1;
(PI+3+5)-' = 1 + X1+3+srl+3+5 ± 1 The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the "total prob-
1 -(1 -p1)(1-P3)(1-P) ability theorem" which states that for any event B and
_ pipjX,1(wU+ri+r) pairwise disjoint events Ai, 1i(m with Pr{ UAi} = 1, weij=13,35 have
APPENDIX Pr{B} = a Pr{Ai}Pr{BAiA}.
Lemmas A and C can be easily proved in terms of the Hence case 2 is straightforward. For case 1-
following result;
p rISIel)rIe,I+P o a P o aLemma 1: Let a Markov process satisfy the state transi- Ps = Pr{SIec1}Pr{ec1} + Pr{Slnot ec1}Pr{not ea1}
tion diagram:
= PfIPs(c1) + (1
-pod)pr{sno Ci}
X 1 1 =PclPs(c1 + (1-Pc1)P
A
A An
2 For case 3 -
That C1, C2..., Cm are pairwise disjoint implies that
Then eCl,ec2, .. Jem are s-independent although not pairwise dis-joint. The proof is illustrated for m = 2.
Pr{0} = ,1+ and Pr{i} = iPr,Pr{0}. Ps = Pr{SJeEl}Pr{eEl} + Pr{Slnot eEl}Pr{not eEl}
i=l
Proof. This is a fundamental result of Markov processes = Pr{SjecEl}pCl + Pr{Slnot eal }(l -pcl }
(cf. [13]). (because CCF(C1, C1') = )
On Fig. 3, a reliability model for a 3-component system = [Pr{SIe1lneE2}Pr{e 2Ileal} + Pr{SIeflnnot eE2}
with CCF: Pr{not ee2lealpE, + [Pr{S| not eElneE2}
After combining states properly [10], the reliability
model for a 3-component system with CCF can be il- Pr{eE2lnot ea,} + Pr{S|not ealn not eE2}
lustrated as figure A. Pr{not eE2lnot ea}J](1 -pC1)
1 1 1 IP23I A
1+2+3 -143 123 1+2+3 1+2+31=Pre2123
~~~I 1+2+31 1-i123'
P123 12 121 ____2 + Pr{S(CI)Ino C2}Pr{not ec1J]p-
-A1 w 12 r 1+ 2 +rA2P1,2+3A12 w 1+2 \ '23+2+3 1 23 + [Pr{S(C2}1no C1}Pr{ec2}
e,,
W3 w13r 1+ w 3r, 1 E
1 '125A 13 13 3 13 1123A IrP1+2+3 12 p123*P23 A +A232 + Pr{SIno c1 flno C2}(l - Pr{eE2}](1
-pal)
A3 en WI P+2+3 13 P'1A2A3 13 'N
332 A 132 PEIPE2P (EPO + PEI(' Pe2)PI(rl)
Fig. A. 2P P+ (1IpS)P2P(C2) + (1 -Pc)(- P2)PS
(because CCF(C2,C21) = 4)
After further combining, we obtain Figure B which can be
further expanded to give figure 3.
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